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The theory of contestable markets emphasizes potential competition; yet it is reticent on the 
identity of potential  entrants. Recent literature discusses  the (im)possibility  of hit-and-run 
entry for several types of entrants. Cairns and Mahabir (1988) argue that existing firms in 
related markets are most likely to be capable of hit-and-run entry, but unlikely to be motivated. 
This paper expands their arguments by sketching a multi-market framework and by discussing 
a model that captures most of the current debate. The model marks a first step into revising 
contestability theory along the lines of this debate. 
INTRODUCTION 
Potential competition  is an elusive concept in contestable markets theory. It 
drives decision-making by incumbent firms. Yet if a 'feasible' and 'sustainable' 
market outcome exists, incumbent firms will successfully deter entry, and the 
entry threat will not materialize. This may explain the almost complete absence 
of potential entrants in Baumol et al. (1982). Shepherd (1984) and Cairns and 
Mahabir (1988)  question  the  existence  of  the  hit-and-run entry threat: do 
potential entrants exist who are alert to enter almost instantaneously,  and if 
so  do  they  have  sufficient  capacity  to  fully  replace  the  incumbent  firm? 
Moreover, if such firms exist, are they motivated to hit-and-run? By raising 
such questions, these authors shift emphasis from the incumbent firm (he) to 
the potential entrant (she).  They argue that existing firms in related markets 
approach the hit-and-run ideal more closely than either new firm entrants or 
unrelated existing firms such as conglomerates. Since a related firm has already 
invested in capacity, she needs less time and (sunk) entry costs than a com- 
pletely new firm or unrelated conglomerate. The salience  of the entry threat 
may depend upon the source of entry (Hines  1957, pp. 132-3; Brunner 1961, 
p. 250; Scherer 1980, pp. 248-50).  These ideas gain cogency in the context of 
the  emerging multi-market framework, which  explores  (potential)  entry by 
existing firms located in related markets (Brander and Krugman 1983; Bulow 
et al.  1985; Calem 1988). We will argue that multi-market competition  is an 
attractive framework for discussing potential entry into a contestable market. 
The multi-market framework is  of  interest in its own  right, as case  studies 
indicate the need for theory on potential competition  when both incumbent 
firm and  potential  entrant have  a  home  market to  defend  (Watson  1982; 
Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985; van Witteloostuijn and van Wegberg 1991). 
This paper represents a first step in developing a multi-market restatement 
of  contestability  theory along  the  lines  of  Cairns and  Mahabir (1988)  and 
Calem  (1988).  It  introduces  a  conceptual  and  formal  middle  ground  that 
recognizes the comments by Shepherd (1984) and Cairns and Mahabir (1988), 
while keeping as close as possible to the contestable markets theory. The model 
establishes the Bertrand  analogue to Calem's (1988) two-market Cournot model 438  ECONOMICA  [NOVEMBER 
for the symmetric duopoly  case.  It will appear that the capacity constraints 
are crucial for determining the  outcomes  of  the game.  Particularly, perfect 
contestability results occur only if both firms face sufficient excess  capacity: 
both firms should be able simultaneously to serve total demand in both markets. 
Moreover, neither firm will choose  an entry-deterring strategy if entry cost is 
sufficiently small and capacity restrictions are binding (over both markets). A 
model  offers a rationale  for  an unsustainable  pricing strategy. On the  one 
hand,  entry diminishes  home  market profits of  the incumbent firm. On the 
other  hand,  entry imposes  excess  capacity  upon  the  incumbent  firm and 
diminishes  the entrant's capacity to meet demand in her home  market. The 
latter two effects may create a profitable reciprocal entry opportunity into the 
entrant's home market. The net effect may be that allowing entry raises profits. 
The argument is organized as follows.  Section I reviews the discussion  on 
potential  entrants  and  contestability.  Section  II  discusses  the  conceptual 
framework of multi-market competition.  Section III introduces a model that 
captures essential elements of the current debate on contestability. Section IV 
offers  an  appraisal.  Section  V  summarizes  the  argument  and  evaluates 
conclusions. 
I.  CREDIBLE  ENTRY  THREATS  AND  CONTESTABILITY 
Contestable markets theory is based upon a condition of free entry and costless 
exit (Baumol  et al. 1982, p. 349). That is,  entry requires no product-specific 
costs. Moreover, entry lags are short. Any positive profit of incumbent firms 
attracts full-scale  hit-and-run entry before  the  incumbent  can  reply.  As  a 
consequence, price-cutting entrants snatch away even temporary profit oppor- 
tunities.  Shepherd (1984)  and Cairns and  Mahabir (1988)  enquire into  the 
source  of  a credible hit-and-run entry threat. If potential  entrants are new 
firms, they need time and sunk entry costs to build up capacity. Presumably, 
then, potential  hit-and-run entrants are existing firms transferring goods  to, 
rather  than investing in, the entry market (Shepherd 1984, p. 584). For example, 
import  competition  constitutes  a  major  threat  against  market  shares  of 
dominant firms (Scherer 1980, pp. 241 and 249-50). 
Cairns and Mahabir (1988) question the entry motive of an existing firm. 
Suppose she really devotes resources to hit-and-run entry. By shipping goods 
to an entry market, she withdraws these goods  from her home market if she 
faces binding capacity constraints. This induces excess demand in her home 
market, which  in turn invites further entry by entrants from other markets, 
provided  any entry barriers are surmountable. These  entrants capture con- 
sumers deserted by the initial entrant. When she returns from her hit-and-run 
activity, the entrant may discover she no longer has a home market (Cairns 
and Mahabir 1988, p. 271). Thus, entry has an opportunity cost, consisting of 
home-market profits forgone,  the  size  of  which  depends  on  the  entrant's 
capacity constraint. An anticipative firm with a binding  capacity constraint 
will not give in to temporary entry opportunities. 
This argument points to excess capacity as a source of credible entry threats. 
If firms have excess capacity, they can hit-and-run while continuing to serve 
their home market. Costly excess capacities are not sustainable in a contestable 
market, however (Cairns and Mahabir 1988, p. 271). If excess capacity involves 1992]  CREDIBLE  ENTRY  THREATS  439 
a cost,  a lower-cost  firm with capacity just right will prey upon  a high-cost 
firm  with excess capacity. In similar vein as Penrose (1959), Cairns and Mahabir 
(1988, p. 273) point to sustainable sources of overcapacity. For example, excess 
capacity may be due to indivisible equipment, in which case it does not impose 
avoidable costs on the firm. This suggests that the existence of incumbent firms 
with sustainable excess  capacity in nearby markets is a necessary condition 
for hit-and-run entry. We will substantiate this in a multi-market framework. 
II.  THE  MULTI-MARKET  APPROACH 
A multi-market framework consists  of  (in  our case)  two markets which  are 
somehow  related. That is, an incumbent firm in one of these markets is able 
to  enter the  other market by  using  existing  home-market resources.  Using 
existing resources for an entry activity does involve some costs, in particular 
adjustment costs in the case of technology-substitute competition and transport 
costs in the case of export competition.  Entry is easy for established firms if 
these costs are low (Calem  1988, p. 171). Thus, the defining characteristic of 
a set of  related markets is ease of entry by established firms. 
Ease of entry does not hold for new firm entrants, or for diversifying firms 
from unrelated markets. Entry by these firms is associated with sunk costs of, 
for instance,  product development  and capacity  investment. Such costs  are 
usually related to entry barriers. This harks back to pioneering studies which 
argued that related firms are not deterred by conditions  that provide unsur- 
mountable entry barriers to others (Andrews 1949; Hines 1957; Brunner 1961; 
Caves 1971; Yip 1982). For instance, Caves (1971) notes a paradox. A multi- 
national firm enters other countries in order to exploit her economies of scale, 
product differentiation advantages and absolute  cost  advantages (including 
low  capital  costs  derived  from retained earnings and  good  credit ratings). 
These  entry inducements coincide  with  Bain's  (1956)  entry barriers to  new 
firms. Empirical tests by Gorecki (1975, 1976) and Shapiro (1983) confirm that 
variables (such as R&D intensity)  which have a significantly negative effect 
upon new firm entry may have a positive or insignificant effect upon existing 
firm entry. 
The use of shared resources in home and entry markets may give rise to 
entry inducements. Unlike intangible assets, such as know-how, tangible assets 
are rivalrous in use; that is, when used for one  (entry) market, they are not 
(simultaneously) available to another (home) market. This imposes an oppor- 
tunity cost upon entry, which may undermine the credibility of the entry threat. 
Excess capacity may be a credible entry inducement. The firm may also shed 
the excess  capacity, however. If excess  capacity is costly  (because  of wages 
of the employees,  for example),  she may want to shed the excess  by laying 
off workers. This may be costly too,  however, in so far as exit barriers exist. 
Excess capacity may be prolonged to serve random demand fluctuations, in 
which case it is profitable from a home-market perspective (e.g. Hviid  1990, 
p. 135). Moreover, if  capacity  is indivisible,  shedding  capacity may require 
selling the used capital goods, divestiture of the business unit, or closing down 
some of the firm's current production. The markets for used capital goods and 
for business units may be very imperfect. (Some assets are 'lemons'.) Closing 
down may be costly or may hurt the firm's other activities. In cases with exit 440  ECONOMICA  [NOVEMBER 
barriers, random  demand  and  indivisible  units,  therefore,  it  may be  more 
profitable to search for new  outlets for the firm's products. Excess  capacity 
will then drive the entry decision. An example of price-cutting excess capacity- 
driven entrants is in Lambkin (1988).  She finds them to be  associated  with 
'early followers', that is with businesses that enter markets later than pioneers 
but earlier than late entrants. 
In the competition with an existing firm entrant, the incumbent firm has a 
different menu of instruments compared with competition against a new firm 
entrant. In particular, the incumbent may choose to retaliate in the established 
entrant's home  market. This  move  is  called  reciprocal entry (Calem  1988, 
p. 180). Case studies support the observation that entry may invite reciprocal 
entry by the incumbent firm (Watson 1982; Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985). An 
alternative case, however, is a one-sided entry threat, if the potential entrant's 
home market is safe against entry (Calem 1988, p. 175). In the case of reciprocal 
entry, multi-market competition can have a number of outcomes. For example, 
all firms may decide  to  enter into  each  other's home  market (Brander and 
Krugman 1983; Calem  1988; Anderson  and  Fischer  1989; Venables  1990). 
Thus, they develop into multi-market firms. Conversely, neither firm may enter 
for fear of provoking reciprocal entry into his/her  home market (Bulow et al. 
1985, pp. 505-6').  In an intermediate case, the 'mutual foothold equilibrium', 
firms maintain a foothold  in each others' markets (Karnani and Wernerfelt 
1985); that is, they have a commitment to a fast reciprocal entry reply without 
the foothold  itself inviting retaliation. 
The unique features of multi-market competition  show that each type of 
potential entrant induces its own entry (deterrence) game. Bain's (1956  -imit 
price model  and Baumol  et al.'s (1982)  contestable  markets theory seem to 
ignore this. They present one basic type of game in order to capture 'the' entry 
threat. Heterogeneity  of  potential  entrants, however,  has  both  quantitative 
implications (subsumed by Bain in the size of the limit price) and qualitative 
implications (features of the entry game). Initially, economists who advocated 
the salience of established-firm entry, such as Andrews (1949), focused on its 
quantitative aspects-that  is, on established firms' entry lags, costs and scale. 
The game-theoretical studies, beginning with Brander and Krugman (1983), 
focused  on the qualitative aspects, in particular on the multi-market context 
of established firm entry. 
III.  HIT-AND-RUN  ENTRY  BETWEEN  Two  MARKETS 
In the contestability model  it is assumed that firms control prices only. This 
is  a  critical  and  controversial  assumption.'  The  problem  is  that  a  profit- 
maximizing rationing rule instead  chooses  quantities (scales  of  entry) such 
that marginal revenue minus marginal cost is equated across markets (Clemens 
1951). Models where firms control quantities do exist (Calem 1988; Anderson 
and Fischer 1989; Venables 1990). In these two-stage games firms first choose 
total capacity and subsequently decide on output levels for each market. Prices 
are determined in the product market, rather than being quoted by the firms. 
A fully specified model would have firms choose  output (or capacity) levels 
as  well  as  prices.2 This  paper  goes  halfway  by  analysing  a  model  where 
(a)  firms select both quantities and prices in home and entry markets for (b) 1992]  CREDIBLE  ENTRY  THREATS  441 
different  conditions  of  productive  capacity.  The  model  focuses  on  two 
dimensions: excess capacity, and ease of entry (indicated by low entry costs) 
of  the  existing  firm entrant. Special  attention is paid to the  capacity  levels 
necessary to sustain a credible hit-and-run entry threat. The amount of excess 
capacity  required is  a telling  indicator  of  the  realism of  the  (multi-market 
interpretation of the) contestable markets theory. 
Symmetric duopoly 
A and B are two identical  (country) markets of the same tradable consumer 
good.  There are two  firms. Firm 1 is the  incumbent firm in market A  and 
likewise firm 2 in market B. Both have constant and identical unit production 
costs C(O0)  and unit transport or entry costs E(-O).  Our focus is on perfectly 
contestable markets, where entry cost is zero and price equals average produc- 
tion cost (E = 0 and p = C),  and imperfectly contestable markets, where the 
entry cost is positive  (but can be arbitrarily small)  and price is set to deter 
entry (E > 0 and p = C + E).  In each market the demand function  D(p)  is 
downward-sloping  in  the  price p,  and  bounded  between  0,  for p>  R  and 
D(O)<oo,  for p=0.  The  functions  (p-C)D(p)  and  (p-C-E)D(p)  are 
single-peaked; that is, there is a unique pm which maximizes net revenue, and 
for p <ptm net revenue increases in p. This entails that (p -  C)D'(p)  + D(p) 
is downward-sloping: that is, (p -  C)D"(p)  + 2D'(p)  < 0 (similar for unit costs 
C + E).  Primes (')  refer to derivatives. Linear (D" =0)  and concave demand 
(D" <0)  are sufficient conditions.  To give each firm an incentive to consider 
prices in excess of  C + E, we assume that C + E  falls short of the monopoly 
price, ptm,  which maximizes the profit (p -  C)D(p):  E ?pm  -  C. Capacities of 
both  firms are  equal  to  K.  For the  sake  of  convenience,  we  assume  that 
K > D'(C  + E),  i = A, B; that is, capacity -restrictions  are non-binding if only 
one market is served against the entrant's unit cost. To keep notation tractable, 
we use lower- and upper-case letters to refer to markets A and B, respectively. 
Call x and X  firm l's  supply in markets A and B, and, likewise, y and  Y for 
firm 2.  Prices  are pi  in  market A  and  Pi  in  market B,  (i =  1, 2.  Figure  1 
summarizes the crucial symbols. 
MARKET  A 
Incumbent  firm  y 
(X,Pl) 
en try  (,2) 
(Y'P2) 
-  Incumbent  firm  2 
MARKET B 
FIGURE  1.  Two-market model. 
Simultaneous markets 
The game evolves in three subgames. The firms decide on home-market prices 
Pi  and  P2 (subgame  1),  entry market prices  PI  and  P2  (subgame  2),  and 
quantities x, X, y  and  Y (subgame 3). In subgame 3 the firms allocate  their 442  ECONOMICA  [NOVEMBER 
capacity to the two markets and consumers decide  which firm to buy from.3 
Payoffs  (profits)  accrue  as  a  result. The  simultaneous-markets assumption 
implies that in each subgame the firms decide  simultaneously  (Bulow  et al. 
1985, pp. 489-90). The markets are segmented; that is, prices may differ between 
markets as there is no arbitrage trade (Brander and Krugman 1983, p. 314). 
Following  the theory of  contestable  markets, in each market the incumbent 
decides first. Hit-and-run entry occurs if an entrant undercuts the incumbent's 
price  (subgame  2)  and captures his sales  (subgame  3).  In an (im)perfectly 
contestable market hit-and-run does not actually occur; it is rather a response 
to unsustainable pricing, and so out-of-equilibrium behaviour, by the incum- 
bent firm. A perfect equilibrium is the natural device for enquiring whether 
the threat is effectuated when called for. 
Demand rationing 
Given the prices in a market, consumers buy from the lowest-priced supplier 
up to his/her  capacity. If any residual demand arises, they turn to the other 
supplikr. The literature has developed  several demand rationing schemes. We 
adopt the one in Levitan and Shubik (1972), which is, admittedly, the easiest 
to use.4 In this scheme, if the lowest-priced supplier i sells qi units, residual 
demand for the highest-priced supplier j  with price pj is D(pj)  -  qi. We use 
the tie-breaking rule that, if two  firms quote the same price, all consumers 
turn to the incumbent firm. Predation therefore requires that the entrant strictly 
underprices the incumbent firm. This resembles the Bertrand assumption in 
contestability  theory.  The  firm, for  instance  firm  1,  anticipates  individual 
demand levels  d'( *  ), i = A, B, by the rule that 
(1)  d  A(p1)  =  fDA(p1)  if PI  <P2 
(  max {D  A(pI)  -y,  O}  if PI > P2, 
where y is firm 2's sales level in market A. 
Supply  rationing 
The firms may meet more demand in both markets than they can satisfy, given 
their capacity constraints (K).  We use the following supply rationing rule. The 
firm will fully serve demand in his/her  most profitable market; (s)he will then 
operate  his/her  residual  capacity  to  supply  the  other  market. The  most 
profitable  market  to  firm  1 is his  home  market  A if Pi -  C 2  P1 -  E -  C. In the 
case  of a tie (if Pi -  C = P1 -  C -  E),  the firm prefers  to sell  in his home  market. 
Thus, the profit-maximizing supply schedule for, say, firm 1 is 
(2)  x={min  {Kl,d(pl)}  if p, 2  P1 -  E 
(mmn  {K, -  X, dA(p1)}  if p1 < P1  -  E, 
and  similar  for  X  in  market  B.  Moreover,  x =0  if  pi <  C,  and  X =0  if 
P1 < C + E.  Thus,  the  firm serves  his  most  profitable market first, respects 
his  capacity  constraint  (x + X < K,),  and  avoids  producing  unsold  goods 
(x '  dA(p1)). 
An  equilibrium  outcome  of  the  game  is  (PI,  P2, P 9,  P2,  X, X, y,  Y).  The 
question to be answered is whether the entry-deterring prices in settings with 
perfect  contestability  (C)  and  imperfect  contestability  (C + E)  constitute 
equilibria  in  our  two-market  game.  An  (im)perfectly  contestable  markets 1992]  CREDIBLE  ENTRY  THREATS  443 
equilibrium is associated with Pi = P2  =  C + E  (where E  may be zero), while 
the entrant's prices are not below the incumbent's (P1  ?  P2; that is, P1 =  P2 + A2 
with zA2> 0).  So, we can produce the following  definition. 
Definition. A  contestable  markets equilibrium is  defined  as  (C + E,  C + E, 
C+E+  A1, C+E+  A2,  D(C+E),O,O,  D(C+E)),  Ai>O,  i=  1,2. 
We will identify values of E and K where neither firm will unilaterally defect 
from this contestability equilibrium. If both firms quote a price equal to C + E 
in the first stage, they will not underbid each other in the entry market game, 
since doing so would entail a loss.  In the third subgame each firm therefore 
faces home-market demand D(C  + E). Thus, any defection from the proposed 
equilibrium must occur in the first subgame.5 
Firm l's  profits are as follows.  In the proposed  equilibrium, each firm's 
profit margin equals E, with profits of ED(C  + E).  If firm 1 unilaterally defects 
in the first stage by quoting a Pi > C + E, firm 2 may prey upon firm 1 in the 
second  stage. Firm 2's supply in market A depends  on relative profitability, 
that is, on whether P2 >  P2+E(=C+2E)  or P2?'P2+ E. If, on the one hand, 
(P2<)Pl  '  P2  + E = C + 2E, firm 2 will serve her home market first and use her 
excess  capacity  (K -  D(C  + E)),  which is positive  by assumption, for entry 
into market A. This may be called partial entry: firm 1 loses part of his home 
market sales.  Firm 2's profits are ED(C+E)+(p2-C-E)[K-D(C+E)], 
where firm 2 just underbids firm 1 (P2 = Pl  -  E with E arbitrarily  close to zero). 
This payoff exceeds his profit for the strategy where firm 2 does not prey upon 
firm 1 (=ED(C  +E)).  Firm 1 satisfies residual demand in his home-market 
demand,  D(pJ)-I[K-D(C+E)],  with  a  profit  equal  to  (p1-C)x 
[D(p1) + D(C  + E) -  K].  Anticipating this in the first stage, firm 1 sets a price 
Pi that maximizes his profit, subject to the constraints that C + E < p? '  P2+ 
E(=C+2E).  If, on the  other hand, p1(>p2)>P2+E,  firm 2 will first enter 
market A, serve all demand D(p2),  and satisfy her home market B by deploying 
her excess  capacity (K -  D(p2)),  where P2=  Pl  -  E. This may be called  total 
entry: firm 1 loses all home-market sales. Firm 1 will satisfy residual demand 
in his entry market B. His profit equals (P1 -  C -  E)[D(P1)  + D(p1 -  E) -  K], 
which is maximized by an appropriate choice  of Pi in the first and P1 in the 
second stage. Obviously, firm 1 is interested in keeping Pi as low as possible 
in order to  induce  firm 2 to  deploy  as much of  her capacity as possible  in 
market A. Thus, Pi = P2+ E + E = C +2 + E. This implies a profit of  (P1 -  C - 
E)[D(P1)  + D(C  +2E)  -  K], which firm 1 maximizes by an appropriate choice 
of P1. Firm l's  profits 7r then equal 
[(a)  ED(C  + E) if Pi =  C + E [entry deterrence], 
(3)  71 =  (b)  maxp  1 (Pi -  C)[D(p1)  + D(C  + E) -  K] if C + E < p, '  C + 2E [partial entry], 
(c)  maxp1(P1-C-E)[D(P,)+D(C+2E)-K]if  p1=C+2E+E[total  entry]. 
This induces a proposition. 
Proposition. (i) If entry costs are zero (E = 0), the proposed perfectly contest- 
able market equilibrium (Pi = P2 = C) holds if, and only if, each firm's capacity 
exceeds  demand in both markets, that is if K ?  2D(C).  (ii) If entry costs are 
positive (E >  0), the proposed imperfectly contestable equilibrium (Pi = P2 - 
C +E)  holds if, and only if, 'sufficient' excess capacity exists. 444  ECONOMICA  [NOVEMBER 
Proof. (i) The first option (3a) entails zero profits with sales of D(C).  The 
second option (3b) refers to an empty set (C <P  '? C). The third option (3c) 
entails positive profit and sales if, and only if, K < 2D(C).  Thus, if K 2  2D(C), 
the  first option  has zero  profits and is the  only  one  with positive  sales.  If 
K < 2D(C),  the third option is the only one with strictly positive profits.  D 
Proof. (ii) The profit levels in equation (3) are functions of E and K. Call 
these functions Gi(E, K), with i = 1, 2, 3; for example, G1(E, K) = ED(C  + E). 
Firms defect  from the contestable  markets outcome  if at least one  i (=2,  3) 
exists such that  Gi(E, K) > G1(E, K).  The  sustainability frontier, S{(E, K)}, 
contains  the  (E, K)-values  where  each  firm  is  just  indifferent  between 
obeying  and  defecting  from the  contestable  markets outcome:  S{(E, K)} = 
{(E, K)  3iGi(E,  K) = G1(E, K)  and Vj (#  i) Gj(E, K) < G1(E, K),  i,j = 2, 3}. 
The frontier falls between the curves K =  D(C  + E)  and K = 2D(C  + E).  If 
K = D( C + E),  then  G1  (E, K) < G2(E, K),  provided that the profit function 
(p-C)D(p)  is  single-peaked  at  pm. That  is,  since  C+E<p1l'C+2E, 
it  follows  that  G1(E,K)=ED(C+E)<(p1-C)D(p1)?<2ED(C+2E)= 
G2(E, K).  Thus,  firm 1 defects  from the  proposed  equilibrium: the  curve 
determined by K = D(C  + E)  is inward of the sustainability frontier. If K = 
2D(C+E),  then  0=Gi(E,K)<G1(E,K)  for  E>0  and  O=Gi(E,K)= 
G1(E, K) with E = 0 for i = 2, 3. Thus, this curve is outward of the sustainability 
frontier.  LI 
So, 'sufficient' excess capacity is required to sustain an imperfectly contest- 
able markets equilibrium. The intuition can be clarified by choosing a specific 
functional form of demand. Figure 2 illustrates the result for an example with 
linear demand: D(p)  = R -  bp, where R, b > 0 (see Appendix  1). 
For the sake of convenience,  call a := R -  bC  and e := bE. By assumption, 
we restrict ourselves to an admissable region (contained by points  BEDFG) 
enclosed  by the lines  E=pm-C  (where e=la)  and K=D(C+E)  (where 
K =  a -  e).  The curve BCAD  is the  sustainability  frontier. On the  line  BF 
holds:  K  = 2D(C  + E)  (=  2(a  -  e)).  In areas 1 and 2 the contestable markets 
equilibrium is reached. In area 3 firms defect from this proposed equilibrium 
notwithstanding excess capacity (D(C  + E) <  K).  Along the curve BC in area 
3, firm 1 defects by inducing total entry by firm 2, and along CA and AD  firm 
1 induces partial entry by firm 2. The non-emptiness of area 2 in this example 
illustrates an interesting point. In contestable markets theory the entry threat 
is driven by the potential entrant's ability to completely duplicate the incumbent 
firm (total entry). This suggests an excess capacity for each entrant equal to 
demand in the incumbent's market evaluated at the unit cost  C + E:  that is, 
K > 2D(C  + E).  Area 2 shows that, if excess capacity is below this level, the 
entrant may still induce the incumbent to deter entry by a unit entry cost price 
(=  C + E).  Furthermore, the figure shows that for given capacity an increase 
in  unit entry cost  may bring the  firms from area 3 to  area  1 or 2; that is, 
an  increase  in  unit  entry  cost  may  facilitate  entry  deterrence  with  unit 
cost prices (= C + E). 
The proposition does not establish which prices firms will quote in area 3. 
While being short of conclusive proof, we suggest that firms resort to a mixed 
equilibrium. We demonstrate the following  lemma. 
Lemma. In area 3, a symmetric pure equilibrium does not exist. 1992]  CREDIBLE  ENTRY  THREATS  445 
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Proof (see Appendix 2).  If a pure equilibrium exists, it must therefore be 
asymmetric. But in a symmetric game  each  asymmetric equilibrium has its 
mirror image: that is,  there are pairs of  these  equilibria. If an equilibrium 
offers payoffs  (V, W)  to  firms 1 and 2,  its mirror-image equilibrium offers 
payoffs ( W, V); that is, the roles of both firms are simply changed. This shows 
that it is impossible  for both firms to prefer the same equilibrium: if  V>  W, 
firm 1 prefers the former and firm 2 the latter equilibrium. This rules out the 
possibility that the firms have a compelling reason to coordinate on a Pareto- 
optimal equilibrium. The outcome of the non-cooperative game is thus random. 
This is in striking contrast to the (im)perfectly contestable markets outcome. 
Whether the randomized outcome is a (mixed) equilibrium is another matter. 
A folk theorem among game theorists suggests that the number of equilibria 
is uneven: that is, if there are two pure equilibria, there must be a third mixed 
equilibrium. We cannot, regrettably, prove this conjecture.' 
IV APPRAISAL 
What drives these results is that the firms' entry decisions  in a multi-market 
context  are interdependent by an endogenous opportunity  cost (Calem  1988, 
p. 172). Entry causes a loss  of home-market sales owing to the reduction of 
home-market capacity (a direct effect) and the triggering of reciprocal entry 
(an indirect effect). The indirect eff  ect implies an endogenous opportunity cost 446  ECONOMICA  [NOVEMBER 
of entry as it makes firm l's  opportunity cost of entry dependent  upon firm 
2's reciprocal entry decision.  For instance, firm l's  scale of entry into market 
B, X, has two effects upon  his home-market profits. First, there is the direct 
opportunity  cost that the  entry sales,  X,  reduce the residual capacity left to 
serve home-market demand, K1  -  X. The direct opportunity cost is the loss of 
profits, (Pi -  C)[dA(p1) -  x]  if sales x fall short of demand dA(p),  provided 
that without entry firm 1 would have been able to serve all forthcoming demand. 
Second, there is the indirect opportunity  cost. The entry level, X, reduces firm 
2's residual home-market demand, dB(P2), and sales,  Y, which raises firm 2's 
residual  capacity,  K2-  Y, to  serve her entry market A.  This in turn raises 
firm 2's  scale  of  reciprocal  entry, y,  which  reduces  firm l's  home-market 
demand dA(p1).7 
This  paper  assumes  symmetric ease  of  entry-that  is,  reciprocal  entry. 
Real-world cases often show one-sided entry, however. For instance, entrants 
may have protected home markets, as illustrated by Japanese firms. Indeed, 
models  on the multinational  enterprise often  assume that the multinational 
has a secure home market (see  e.g. Horstmann and Markusen 1989). In the 
United States incursions by protected entrants have induced pressures towards 
a strategic trade policy  which  issues  a demand  for reciprocal access  to the 
entrant's home market, while threatening with protectionism otherwise (Yoffie 
and Milner 1989, p. 113). In terms of our model, contestable markets outcomes 
pertain if the entrant (say, firm 2) has sufficient capacity to serve both her own 
protected  home  market B at the profit-maximizing price  pm and  the  entry 
market A for a price equal to  or above the unit cost  (C + E).  Anticipating 
this, the incumbent in market A quotes the entry-deterring price (= C + E). 
This result holds if D(C  + E) + D(Pm) c K. The contestable markets outcome 
pertains, but only for the entry market A. Thus, contestability does not arise 
as a general (benchmark) case for both markets. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The framework developed  in this paper supports in a formal context Cairns 
and  Mahabir's  (1988)  critique  on  contestability.  (Im)perfect  contestability 
requires sufficient excess  capacity. Otherwise, the possibility  of  hit-and-run 
entry does not force the incumbent to quote a sustainable (zero entry profit) 
price. The model  also  serves a positive  purpose. We suggest that the multi- 
market framework is the proper setting for the kind of restatement of contesta- 
bility that Cairns and Mahabir have in mind. The multi-market competition 
framework is still in its infancy, however. It is far removed from addressing 
the full complexity  of  Cairns and Mahabir's (re)vision.  To be precise, their 
proposal is to study potential  entry by multi-product  firms in a multi-market 
setting. So far, multi-product firm contestability has only been analysed with 
an unidentified entry threat (Baumol et al. 1982; Kim 1987). With multi-market 
competition,  multi-product firms may face  potential  entry by existing  rivals 
from different markets for each  of  their products.  Hence,  rather than total 
entry, where one entrant replaces the incumbent firm entirely, there is partial 
entry, where one entrant replaces only one product in the product line offered 
by an incumbent firm. This is certainly a more realistic approach: Cairns and 
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competition (e.g. Bulow et al. 1985; Calem 1988) and multi-product firms (e.g. 
Brander and Eaton 1984; Shaked and Sutton 1990) are combined. The com- 
plexity  of  this  undertaking,  however,  justifies  paying  attention  first  and 
foremost to the single-product case. 
Future research in this area can deal with several technical issues such as 
different consumer rationing schemes, endogenous  capacity choice, and fixed 
rather than variable entry costs.  Furthermore, it may be of interest to tie in 
other  aspects  of  multi-market competition.  For  instance,  a  positive  multi- 
market spillover can induce a firm to enter another market (Bulow et al. 1985). 
If firms meet in several markets, they may try to extend collusion  from one 
market to all markets where they meet (Pinto 1986; Bernheim and Whinston 
1990). Multi-market contact may increase the incidence  of tacit collusion  by 
facilitating the implicit transfer of signals through price-cutting, output reduc- 
tion and the like. Future research may, for example, identify the capacity level 
necessary to prevent multi-market collusion. 
The multi-market framework in this paper, as well as in Bulow et aL (1985) 
and Calem (1988), can contribute to our understanding of entry strategies by 
existing firms. The multi-market theory shows that new-firm entry needs to be 
sharply distinguished from potential competition by existing firms. New firms 
have neither the cost advantages nor the strategic weaknesses of a vulnerable 
home  market. Contestable  markets theory  is  only  one  example  where this 
aspect of  potential  competition  is ignored.  If this assessment is correct, the 
relevance of the multi-market framework goes beyond the theory of contestable 
markets. 
APPENDIX 1 
Equation (3) implies that each firm compares  the contestable  markets  equilibrium 
payoff  ED(C  + E)  with prices (Pl) equal to C + E to the defection  payoffs 
maxp, (p1-C)(D(pl)+D(C+E)-K) 
if C+E<p1i'C+2E  and 
maxP, (P1 -  C -  E)(D(P1)  + D(C  +2E)  -  K) 
if p, = C + 2E + e (e > 0). We will solve these constrained  maximization  programs, 
called  program  I and program  II respectively,  and then specialize  by assuming  a linear 
demand  function, D(p)  = R -  bP For the sake of brevity,  only interesting  cases are 
presented.  The full proof is available  on request  from  the authors. 
Program I: maxpl (p1-C)[D(pl)+D(C+  E) -  K]  if C+E  < p, < C+2E  [equation 
(3b)]. 
Rewrite this problem into maxp  (p-C)[D(p)+D(C+E)-K]  subject to  (i) p- 
(C+E)?0,  (ii) C+2E-pO0  and (iii) [D(p)+D(C+E)-K]O0.  For the sake of 
convenience,  the strict  inequality  restriction  p > C + E is transformed  into the quasi- 
inequality  constraint  p ?  C + E, which  does not affect  the results.  The Lagrange  function 
is 
L(p, A1, A2, A3)  =  (p -  C)[D(p) + D(C + E)  -  K] +Akl(p  -  C -  E) 
+A2(C+2E-p)+A4kD(p)+D(C+E)-K]. 
The Kuhn-Tucker  conditions are, given that the objective and the constraints  are 448  ECONOMICA  [NOVEMBER 
concave functions (Beavis and Dobbs  1990, p. 54), as follows: 
dL/dp  =  (p  -  C)D'(p)  + D(p)  + D(C  + E)  -  K +  A1  - A2+  A3D'(p)  =  0, 
p-C-E  >  0, 
C+2E  -p'0, 
[D(p)+D(C+E)-K]>0, 
Al(p-C-E)  = 0, 
A2(C+2E  -p)  =0, 
A3[D(p) + D(C  + E)-K]  = 0, 
Ai>0(i=1,2,3). 
Case 1: A1>0,  A2=0  and A3=0 
k  >O--->p=  C+E?'>ir=E[2D(C+E)-K]  =O.  Moreover,  dL/1dp=  ED'(C+E)+ 
2D(C+  E)-K+A1  =0=>A1 =  K -2D(C+E)-ED'(C+E)>  0=>K  >2D(C+E)+ 
ED'(C  +  E).  Call  this  area  A  in  (E, K)-space.  With  linear  demand  D(p)= 
R -  bp,  the  frontier  equals  K = 2D(C  + E) + ED'(C  + E) = 2(R -  bC -  bE) -  bE = 
2(R-bC)-3bE=2a--3e,  where  a:=R-bC  and  e:= bE.  Hence,  A  equals 
{e, K; K > 2a -3e}. 
Case2:Al=O,A2>OandA3=0 
A2>0=>p  =  C+2E=:>'ir=2E[D(C+2E)+D(C+E)-K]. 
Moreover, aL/ap  =A2Eb'(C  + 2E)  + D(C  + 2E)  +  D(C  + E)  -  K - A2 = 0 =  A2= 
2ED'(C  + 2E)  + D(C  + 2E)  + D(C  + E) -  K > 0 =  K < 2ED'(C  + 2E)  + D(C  + 
2E)  +  D(C  +  E).  Call this  area C  in  (E, K)-space.  With linear demand,  D(p)  = 
R -  bP,  this  amounts  to  the  frontier  K  =  2(R  -  bC)  -  5bE  =  2a  - Se,  which  defines  C 
as the set {e,K K;  <  2a-5e}. 
Case 3:  A1  =0,  A2=O and A3=0 
AI=O=Xp?C+E,  A2=0=>C+2E  ?-p,  and  dL/dpp=(p-C)D'(p)+D(p)+D(C+ 
E) -  K =  0,  from  which  price  and  payoff  follow.  Note  that  an  internal  solution 
must  exist  within  the  constraints;  that  is,  dL/dp(=C+E)>0=aL/p(=p)> 
aL/ap(=C+2E),  knowing that aL/dp(=p)  is a downward-sloping  curve: a2Llap2= 
(p -  C)D"(p)  +2D'(p)  <0,  by the assumption of  single-peakedness.  The constraints 
then  imply  that  ED'(C+E)+2D(C+E)-K>0>2ED'(C+2E)+D(C+2E)+ 
D(C+E)-K;  that is, 2ED'(C+2E)+D(C+2E)+D(C+E)<K  < ED'(C+E)+ 
2D(C  + E).  Call this area B in (E, K)-space.  With linear demand, D(p)  = R -  bP, B 
is defined as {e, K; 2a-5e<K  <2a-3e}. 
Program II:  maxpl (P1 -  C-E  )(D(P1) + D(C  + 2E) -  K)  if  p1  > C + 2E  [equation 
3c)]. 
Rewrite the  program into  maxp (p -  C -  E)[D(p)  + D(C  +2E)  -  K]  subject  to  (i) 
p-C-E  ? 0 and (ii)  D(p)  + D(C  + 2E)-K?:  0. The Lagrange function is 
L(p, A1, A2)  =  (p-  C -E)[D(p)+D(C+2E)-K]+A1(p-  C -E) 
+A2[D(p)+D(C+2E)-K], 
with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions  that 
d3L/dp = (p  -  C - E)D'(p)  + D(p)  + D(C  + 2E)  -  K +  A1  +  A2D'(p)  =  0, 
p -  C-E  >  0, 
D(p)+D(C+2E)-K  ?0, 
Al(p  -  C -  E)  = 0, 
A2[D(p)+D(C+2E)-K]  =0, 
Ai_>  0 (i = 1, 2). 
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A1=0?:p?C+E  and A2=0=>D(p)+D(C+2E)-K?0.  Moreover,  aL/dp=(p-C- 
E)D'(p)+D(p)+D(C+2E)-K  =0. The associated  payoff  is the interior  maximum. 
By assumption,  (p - C - E)D'(p) + D(p),  and therefore  aL/dp, is downward-sloping. 
At p = C+E  it must  hold that 0< aL/dp. Therefore,  0< D(C+E)+D(C+2E)-K; 
that is, K < D(C + E) + D(C + 2E). With linear demand  D(p) = R - bP, the frontier 
is K=2(R-bC)-3bE=2a-3e,  which gives area D  equal to {e,K;K<2a-3e}. 
This includes  both areas B and C. 
To sum up, the payoff  of program  II equals  zero unless K<D(C+E)+D(C+2E), 
which is the area D that includes both areas B and C. That is, solution of programs 
I and II shows that in the linear case three areas  of interest  exist: areas A, B and C. 
In area A profit  is zero (an inconsistent  case). Defection is profitable  if, and only if, 
the payoff  of program  I and/or II exceeds  the payoff  ED(C + E) (=E(R - bC - bE)) 
with Pi = C + E. We now proceed with the linear demand case: D(p) = R - bP. The 
assumption  D(C + E) < K  can be rewritten  as a -  e < K, and the assumption  E < 
pm -  C can be reformulated  as e <2a.  This  defines  the admissible  region  {(e, K); e <2a 
and a - e < K}. Noting that E = e/b  and C = (R - a)/b,  the following equilibrium 
strategies  per area can be determined. 
Area A: {e, K; 2a -3e  < K}.  Firm 1 (and, along similar  lines, firm  2) faces three 
options. Option 1: p1=C+E  with profits &Tl=ED(C+E)=e(a-e)/b.  Option 2: 
p1  = C + E + e < C + 2E  (program I above) with profits  rrE2  E[2D(C + E) - K] = 
e[2(a-e)-K]/b.  Option  3: Pi>  C+2E  (program  II above) with  profits 7r3=0.  Firm 
1 then  faces  the question,  Does r2  exceed  ir?  r2  7rl  = e(a - e - K)/b. By  assumption, 
a - e = D(C + E) < K: therefore, rr2_ rl1< 0. Firm 1 will not defect from  the contest- 
able markets  equilibrium. 
Area B:  {e,K;  2a-5e<K<2a-3e}.  Firm 1  (and, for that matter, firm 2) 
faces three options (as above). Option 1: identical to option 1 in area A. Option 
2:  ir2=  [2(R - bC) - bE - K]2/4b  = (2a -  e - K)2/4b.  Option  3:  ir3  = 
[2(R - bC) -3bE  - K]2/4b  = (2a -3e  -  K)2/4b.  7r2  > 7r3  as  0<2a-3e-K< 
2a - e - K  (if  e > 0).  Firm l's  problem is  to  choose  option  1  or  2.  Define 
A:=  4b(72-  7r1)=(2a-e-K)2  -4e(a-e)=K2+K(2e-4a)+5e2  -8ae+4a2.  A=0 
if,  and  only  if,  K1,2=2a-e?2x/[e(a-e)].  Since  K<2a-3e<2a-ec 
2a - e + 21/[e(a - e)] = K2, K2 falls out of range.  Thus, firm 1 is indifferent  between 
obeying  or  defecting  from  the  equilibrium  if,  and  only  if,  K =K1= 
2a - e - 21/[e(a - e)]; he defects  if, and only if, K < K1  (within  the set B). K1  intersects 
B's lower  bound K = 2a - 5e at (0, 2a) and point A = (a/5, a). K1  intersects  B's upper 
bound K = 2a -  3e at (0, 2a) and point D = (la,. a).  In the admissible  region (where 
e2<a)  K1  is downward-sloping  as aK,/ae = -1-  (a -2e)//[e(a  -  e)] <0. At point A 
the slope is -5/2  and at point D the slope is -1. 
Area  C: {e, K; K < 2a - 5e}.  Firm  1 (and, similarly,  firm  2) faces the three  options 
as above.  As for  profits,  7rl  in area  C is identical  to 7rl  in area  A, ir2 = 2e(2a -3e  - K)/b, 
and area C's  7r  is  identical to area B's  73.  Firm 1 faces two problems. (i) Call 
A =  r2-7r  = e(3a -5e  -2K)/b.  Firm  1 is indifferent  (A  = 0) if K = (3a -5e)/2.  Firm 
1 defects if (but not only if: see (ii))  K<(3a-5e)/2.  (ii) Call A  =4b(nr3-_rl)= 
(2a-3e-K)2-4e(a-e)=K2+K(6e-4a)+13e2-16ae+4a2.  A  =0  if,  and  only 
if,  K1,2=2a-3e?\21[e(a-e)].  K-c2a-5e<2a-3e-c2a-3e+2x/[e(a-e)]=K2: 
therefore K2 is out of range. Firm 1 is indifferent  in problem (ii) if, and only if, 
K = K2  = 2a -  3e -  21[e(a -  e)]; he defects  if, and only if, K <2a -  3e -  21[e(a -  e)]. 
Problems  (i)  and  (ii)  imply  that  firm  1  defects  if,  and  only  if,  K < 
max  {3a - 5e)/2, 2a - 3e - 21\[e(a - e)}. To find  the maximum  of the two upper-bound 
frontiers,  it is instructive  to know that K1(0)=2a, Kj(a/5)=3a/5,  and Kj(a)=-a. 
So &K1/&e=-3-(a-2e)/V\[e(a-e)],  and thus &K1/&e(0)=-oo. If  e<a/2,  then 
9K1/ee  < 0: that is, the frontier  is decreasing  in e. The frontier  is convex  as a22Kl/Iee2  = 
{2e(a -  e) + '(a -  2e)2}/e(a  -  e)3/2  >  0. K1 intersects C's upper boundary K = 2a - 5e 
at the points B = (0, 2a) and H =(-a,  -a).  K1 intersects  the line K = (3a -  5e)/2 at 
point C = (a/17, a23/17) and (a, -a).  The line K = (3a -5e)/2  intersects  the line 
K = (3a5e)/2 at point C = (a/17, a23/17) and (a, -a).  The line K = (3a -5e)/2  inter- 
sects C's upper  boundary  line K = 2a - Se at point A = (a/5, a). 450  ECONOMICA  [NOVEMBER 
So  the  areas A,  B  and  C  in  (e, K)-space  give  the  critical points  A =  (a/5,  a), 
B=  (0, 2a),  C = (a/17,  a23/17),  D  = (la,  la),  E = (0,  a),  F  = (la,  a)  and  G = (la,  2a). 
Points B and C are on the curve K=2a-3e-21\[e(a-e)]  (where program II is the 
alternative to sustainable pricing; that is,  7rl  =  7r3>  &r2). Points  C  and A  are on the 
line K = (3a -  5e)/2  (where program I is the alternative to sustainable pricing: that is, 
7r 1r2>  r3).  Points  A  and  D  are  on  the  curve  K=2a-e-21\[e(a-e)]  (where 
program I  is the alternative to sustainable pricing: that is,  7  r=  7r2>  7r3).  Points D, F 
and G are on the line e =  la  and points E and D are on the line K = a -  e. (Both lines 
delimit the admissible region.) The results are summarized in Figure 2 in the text. We 
conclude that, within the admissible region, firm 1 defects for (e, K)  values in area 3, 
enclosed by points BCADE. He does not defect from the contestable market equilibrium 
in area 2, enclosed  by points  BCADF, or area 1, enclosed  by points BFG. 
APPENDIX  2 
Proof of the lemma. 
Call the  symmetric pure equilibrium (p, p, r, r, q, z, z, q).  Home-market prices p  will 
exceed  the  'contestable'  level  of  C + E.  (Firms deviate  from pricing equal to  C + E 
only if they can do better.) Distinguish two cases. 
Case (la),  r?  C + E < p, and (lb),  C + E < p ?  r.  In both cases, neither firm sells in 
his/her  entry market: either it is not profitable (case  la)  or the price is too high (case 
lb).  As a result, home-market sales q = D(p),  entry market sales z = 0, and profits are 
(p -  C)D(p).  This cannot be an equilibrium, for each firm will defect in the second 
stage by underbidding the other firm. For instance,  firm 1 will quote a P1 such that 
C + E < P1  <p.  He is also the only (case la)  or the lowest-priced (case lb)  supplier in 
his home market (assuming that firm 2 does not defect). In the third subgame the firm 
can  choose  to  serve  the  home  market first, with  sales  D(p)  and  entry sales  X = 
min {D(P1),  K -  D(p)},  or to serve the entry market first, with entry sales X = D(P1) 
and home-market sales x = min {D(p),  K -  D(P1)}. This means that profits then follow 
from 
max {(p -  C)D(p)  + (P1 -  C -  E) min  {D(P1),  K -  D(p)}, 
(p  -  C)  min  {D(p),  K -  D(P1)}+  (P1 -  C -  E)D(P)}. 
This exceeds the equilibrium profit (p -  C)D(p)  as K -  D(p)  is strictly positive. (This 
follows  from D(p)<D(C+E)<K.)  Firm 1 thus defects. 
Case (2):  C + E < r < p.  Each firm is lowest-priced supplier in his/her  entry market. 
From the rationing rules (1)  and (2)  it follows  that entry market sales are z = D(r), 
home-market sales are q = 0,  and equilibrium profits are Tr  =  (r -  C -  E)D(r).  In the 
case of unilateral defection  by firm 1, however, firm 1 may quote a price Pi = C + E, 
while firm 2 continues to quote  P2=  p. In the second  stage, firm 2 cannot profitably 
underbid firm 1, Pi = C + E <  P2,  and firm 1 will underbid firm 2 in his home market, 
C + E < P1  < p. Being lowest-priced supplier in both markets, in the third stage firm 1 
may serve either his home market or his entry market first. He realizes a (defection) profit 
id  =max{ED(C+E)+(P,-C-E)  min [K-D(C+E),  D(PI)], 
E min [D(C  + E),  K -  D(P1)] + (P, -  C -  E)D(P1)}, 
subject to  P1  <p.  Since  D(P1) < D(C  + E) < K,  rd  strictly exceeds  the  (constrained 
optimal)  profit  level  iCT:= maxp  (P  -  C -  E)D(P)  subject  to  P <p.  This  in turn  weakly 
exceeds  the  equilibrium  profit  re =  (r -  C -  E)D(  r)  for  r <p:  as a default,  firm  1 may 
choose  P1  = r, such that  rrc  =  7re.  Thus,  d  >  Tc  2  Te*  Firm 1 will again defect.  Both 
cases together imply that if  C + E < p, no price r exists which induces a unique pure 
equilibrium.  O 
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NOTES 
1. But this is also a time-honoured assumption. Consider Andrews (1949, p. 174): 'At that normal 
costing  price,  the  business  man will  be  prepared to  supply  whatever his  market will  take, 
ignoring any extra-ordinary rise in his costs, so far as his equipment and labour-force will let 
him.' Perry (1984) shows that, if a monopolist  controls price and quantity simultaneously, in 
a setting otherwise identical to a perfectly contestable market, he may choose a price-quantity 
schedule such that he deters entry while earning positive profits. 
2.  Venables  (1990)  explores  several  multi-market models.  One  comes  close  to  ours  by  using 
Bertrand competition. However, it explores differentiated products, since this allows demand 
to be continuous  in the firm's own price. The case of homogeneous  products seems,  as yet, 
not to have been explored. 
3.  One can think of two chain stores, which publish their new week's prices on Saturday, and 
which stock their shops on Monday morning. Consumers buy from the incumbent store unless 
the entrant's store is lower-priced. The model assumes centralized pricing; that is, the chain 
store, rather than local  managers, sets prices in both markets. This is one  area where chain 
stores have different strategies. 
4.  This rule is also used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Gelman and Salop (1983). Dixon 
(1987,  p. 289)  offers a  number  of  rationales  for  this  rationing  rule,  including  the  unique 
connection between the Levitan and Shubik rationing rule and the Cournot model. Davidson 
and Deneckere (1986) present a comparison with another often employed scheme. 
5.  Subgame perfection implies that, if firm 1 unilaterally defects in the first subgame, firm 2 defects 
from the proposed equilibrium in the second and third subgames. 
6.  We do not apply Dasgupta and Maskin's (1986) existence  proofs of mixed equilibria for we 
read their theorems as applying to open-loop  Nash equilibria rather than closed-loop  perfect 
equilibria. 
7.  This confirms Kaldor's (1935, p. 48) visionary statement on excess-capacity-induced  entry by 
existing firms: 'Let us suppose that one of them finds it profitable to produce another commodity, 
highly competitive with the products of some other producers. These latter producers will now 
find the demand for their products reduced; and this may make it profitable for them to engage 
in the production of a second, or even a third, commodity-even  if it was not profitable before.' 
Kaldor (1935, pp. 48-9)  observes that (in our terms) an endogenous  opportunity cost drives 
this process. 
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